Not the Negative Income Tax Again! James Cox W "T"util recendy, I had thought that the negative income tax was one of the fashions of the 1960s and 1970s which has since been abandoned in the V s sober light of subsequent experience. In particular, experiments in the United States, which facilitated an investigation of the effects of replacing the exist ing welfare system by a more generous one, showed that the negative income tax reduced hours of work, especially by wives and younger men, and increased rates of marital instability.
T he idea now seems to be making a comeback. In a recent article, Professors Peter Dawkins and John Freebairn (1997) discuss the reasons for die increase in unemployment since die 1960s and what might be done to reduce die level of un employment. They conclude dial furdier product-market reform and lower real wages, especially for die less skilled, are required. Since die labour market is un likely (in dieir view) to be signilicandy reformed in the near future, consideration should be given to reducing award wages. Dawkins and Freebairn believe diat die Industrial Relations Commission is more likely to agree to diis if diose receiving reduced award wages can be compensated dirough die tax and transfer systems. They suggest diat a tax credit (or negative income tax program) that takes family circumstances into account could compensate low-wage earners for reduced award See Murray (1984:147-53) and Munnell (1987) for further discussion.
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wages. T he introduction o f earned income tax credits might, however, be consid ered as an interim measure.
In a related publication, investigate alternative negative income tax proposals. They argue that a simple negative income tax could improve incentives by replacing the many complex and overlapping means tests that now exist in Australia. T he simplest negative income tax involves providing tax credits to all adults, which are increased for those who have children or pay high rents to pri vate landlords. T he tax credits and any private income are then added together and taxed at a constant rate. Low-income individuals (for whom tax credits exceed tax payable) will receive a payment from the government, but higher-income individuals will be required to make a payment.
T hese authors also investigate more complex versions o f the negative income tax, in which tax credits are phased out as income increases; some people receive a reduced guaranteed income (or none at all); or supplements are paid to persons who are eligible to receive social security benefits. These modified versions are less expensive than the pure negative income tax, but they retain some o f the complexity o f die present tax and transfer arrangements. 4. W hat can be said, particularly in the light of the experiments in the United States, about the possible unintended consequences of introducing a negative in come tax?
Some comments follow on each of diese points.
Targeting
The main issue here is dial, while low wages are earned by individuals, low income in relation to dieir needs is a problem for all members of a family or a household. Most families or households share incomes to some extent, even if diey do not do so with complete fairness. Many people who cam low wages belong to families whose total income is adequate: they may, for example, be secondary earners or sons or daughters just starting employment. By contrast, a single-income family widi high needs may experience difficuldes even diough die sole earner's wage rate, considered in isoladon, is adequate. Indeed, these difficuldes may result from the limited extent of die family's participadon in die labour market radier dian from low wages. The reladonship between low wages and low family income is dierefore probably not a close one. One feels diat diis point needs to be made carefully to die Industrial Relations Commission. Regrettably, however, Dawkins et al. do not investigate die extent of corrcladon between low' wages and low family incomes. Low-income families in employment widi children, and diose paying high rents to private landlords, already receive considerable government assistance. The negadve income tax proposals would extend assistance to similar families widi higher incomes. This would not do much to address any problem of family poverty diat might be worsened as a result of lower award wages.
Dawkins et al. provide tables showing die distribudonal consequences of dieir proposals for families classified according to dieir private (non-benefit) income. The distribudonal impacts of the various proposals differ substandally. As a general rule, diey tend to increase incomes at the bottom end of die distribudon of family private incomes and to reduce incomes at die top end. Income survey data from die Australian Bureau of Stadsdcs (1997:12-13, Table 1 ) suggest diat there are reladvely few employed persons in families within die bottom three deciles of die family gross income distribudon. This is likely to be even more true of die private income distribudon, which excludes government benefits. The negadve income tax pro posals seem unlikely, therefore, to be efficient in providing addidonal assistance to families which include low-wage earners.
Incentives
Dawkins et al. discuss die incendve effects of dieir proposals in terms of changes to die cffecdve marginal rates arising from the interacdon of die tax and social security Exceptions are option lb (a reduction in the income guarantee below the age pension level) and op tion 2 (a reduced income guarantee plus tax credits which are tapered out as income increases). systems 3 4 5 They suggest that a flat marginal rate of 45 per cent is a sensible target in the early stages. This is below the top rate of income tax and also below the effec tive rate experienced over the income range where benefits are abated. Moreover, they argue that many of those who would experience lower effective marginal tax rates under their proposals (lor example, women who are thinking about undertak ing part-time work) are likely to be particularly responsive to incentives.
Although some individuals pay income tax at die top marginal rate, die majority either pay no tax at all (because income is below the tax threshold) or pay tax at a rate substantially below die top marginal rate. To gain an impression of die overall effects of introducing a negative income tax, one may compare the 4o per cent flat tax widi an average of the marginal tax rates arising from the existing arrangements. One might, for example, calculate a person-weighted average marginal tax rate. (This shows how much would be taken in increased tax on average if all taxpayers increased their taxable incomes by one dollar.) This average marginal tax rate can be estimated from taxation statistics to have been 25.4 per cent in 1994/95 (Australian Taxation Office, 1996) .* In addition, die effect of withdrawal of meanstested assistance needs to be considered. I his raises the average marginal tax rate 5 to about 28 per cent.
The difference between die tax rates of 45 per cent and 28 per cent indicates diat significandy more redistribution dian at present would be undertaken were die negative income tax proposals to be implemented. 1 his would tend to have adverse implications for incentives. (Alternatively, die basic income guarantee could be re duced below die age pension level still further; diis would however reduce die at tractiveness of die negative income tax proposals.)
Dawkins et al. argue that diose who experience lower tax rates as a result of die introduction of negative income tax (for example, sole parent pensioners who work part-time) are particularly likely to increase dieir hours of work. 1 he overall incen tive effects of introducing a negative income tax may dierefore be favourable in dieir view. However, many of diose who would experience higher effective tax rates as a result of die negative income tax (for example, women in two-parent lamilies who are contemplating part-time work) may also be particularly sensitive to incentives. In addition, diere are many relevant margins odier dian die choice between leisure and work diat would be affected by die introduction of die negative income tax. Dawkins et id. (1997:27) promise us 'forthcoming dieoretical simulations' to dem onstrate the favourable consequences of introducing a negative income tax lor in centives. In the absence of diese simulations it seems safest to conclude diat die higher effective marginal tax rates (on average) resulting from the negative income tax programs would on balance weaken, rather than strengthen, incentives.
Reciprocal Obligations
The introduction of the negative income tax would reverse the trend towards tighter targeting of welfare that has occurred in recent years. Assessment of entidement to welfare would be based almost entirely on private income. Private income may be too easily subject to manipulation by recipients to be die endre basis for welfare policy. The negadve income tax is contrary to the increasing tendency for benefici aries to be required to perform certain reciprocal obligations in return for receiving benefits. For example, unemployment beneficiaries in Australia are required to be looking for full-time work and may, in addition, be required to work part-time while receiving benefit. There seems to be a good deal of public support for introducing new obligations for certain beneficiaries.
Unintended Consequences
It is easy to contrast the imagined simplicity of a new system, such as negative in come tax, with die messy reality of our existing taxation and social security arrange ments. Neverdieless, die complexity is diere for a purpose, namely, to keep the cost of providing adequate assistance to diose who need it within reason. It will not be easy for governments to dispense widi this complexity.
Those who believe that furdier deregulation of the labour market is desirable should argue for that direcdy. Aldiough die political climate may seem unfavour able, diis can quickly change. It is getting tilings die wrong way round to argue for far-reaching and probably irreversible changes to our social arrangements, the con sequences of which can be foreseen only dimly, to remove what may be only tem porary difficulties. It is, moreover, simple-minded to argue diat labour market de regulation will necessarily lead to lower wages since other aspects of die employ ment contract (such as non-wage benefits and the organisation of work) would also vary.
One effect of introducing die negative income tax would be to make govern ment assistance available in many circumstances where it is not at present. Aldiough it takes time for behaviour to change, experience suggests dial many more people eventually qualify for benefits dian was expected at the time of introduction of the benefit. For example, die number of sole parent pensioners in Australia to day far exceeds earlier expectations. The unintended consequences of the negative income tax experiments in the United States have already been noted. All this indi cates diat governments need to be very cautious indeed about extending assistance to new groups of beneficiaries.
By contrast to the negative income tax, Dawkins and Freebairn's alternative proposal for die introduction of an Earned Income Tax Credit is likely to direct additional assistance to persons earning low wages. But there already is a multiplic ity of programs for low-income families in employment (such as parenting allow-
